Category: Uncategorized

Case Report – On Wild Coyotes and collecting personal information

The British Columbia Information and Privacy Commissioner’s drivers license swiping case (from July 21st) nicely illustrates some points about justifying personal information collection under a necessity standard – a standard for collection common to both public and private sector Canadian data protection legislation.

The IPC’s most significant finding was that Vancouver’s “Wild Coyote Club” could not require patrons to consent to a drivers license swipe (or surrender a piece of ID) as a condition of service because the related collection of personal information went beyond what is “necessary to provide the product or service.” It affirmed that British Columbia PIPA requires that a mandatory collection be reasonably necessary rather than strictly necessary. It also articulated the following two-part test (emphasis added):

For personal information to be “necessary” for the purpose of s. 7(2) of PIPA, the purposes for the collection, use or disclosure must be integral to the provision of the product or service. In addition, the personal information must fulfill a significant role in enabling the organization to achieve that purpose.

The IPC said that these questions will be assessed in light of the sensitivity of the personal information being collected and whether there are less intrusive means of meeting a legitimate objective for collecting the information.

In one sense, the decision demonstrates that broad grounds of justification based on theories of human behavior are hard to argue. In this case, every patron whose license was swiped also had his or her picture taken. The picture was matched with the information from the license, so the club (and law enforcement) had access to picture-based index of all individuals in the establishment on any given night. The club and the other parties who participated in support of swiping argued that such a system would significantly reduce incidents of violence. Though their theory – that individuals would modify their behavior if they know they are identifiable – is logical, the respondent and intervenors did not present any evidence (either statistical or from social science) to show that their theory was true, or to at least show that swiping provided a significantly better violence  deterrent than video surveillance alone. (The IPC addressed the club’s need to keep banned individuals from entering the club separately, and approved of the matching of identifying information other than drivers license numbers against like identifying information in a banned individuals database.)

In another sense, the decision illustrates that having a better record of an event will not ordinarily be sufficient to justify collecting personal information. One cannot dispute that a drivers license swipe creates a highly accurate record of (1) the fact that a patron presented a drivers license and (2) that the drivers license presented contained certain data in electronic form. So the scanning system in place at the club gave it a very accurate record of due diligence, but this wasn’t sufficient justification for the collection of identifying information itself. On this point, the IPC noted correctly that a drivers license swiping system only records the identification someone presents and does not ordinarily aid in authenticating the individual, which still must be done by a door person’s visual inspection of picture identification. The IPC acknowledged a swiping system protects against “passbacks” – a scheme which involves the use of the same identification piece by two different people – but said the club had presented no evidence to demonstrate that passbacks were a significant problem that it encountered in enforcing the terms of its liquor license.

David Fraser has covered the ID swiping issue very well. Click here for an index of his posts.

Order P09-1, 2009 CanLII 38705 (BC I.P.C.).

Case Report – Arbitrator says relevant surveillance evidence is admissible… period

There is a division in Canadian arbitral jurisprudence on whether an arbitrator can (or should) refuse to admit surveillance evidence where the surveillance does not meet a standard of reasonableness. On June 15th, Ontario Arbitrator Stephen Raymond held that relevant surveillance evidence is admissible notwithstanding an alleged breach of privacy. He said:

I do not see that the method by which evidence is obtained has any impact on its admissibility before me. It is either relevant evidence in which case I must admit it or it is not. How it was obtained is of no concern to me. For example, let us assume a situation where a person breaks into a manager’s office and while in the office finds a document that is relevant to a question before an arbitrator. Clearly the action of the person breaking into the office could be pursued criminally and if that person was an employee (bargaining unit member or not) it might be pursued civilly. The illegality of the method by which the document was obtained, however, would not be a consideration in respect of its admissibility before an arbitrator. If evidence that is obtained in a clearly illegal way can be admitted, how is it that evidence that is obtained in a way that offends the sensibilities of many arbitrators but is not illegal is not admissible? The simple answer is that it is admissible.

I also note that many arbitrators who have excluded surreptitious videotape surveillance evidence seem to base their decision, in part, on the nature of the evidence. I do not see how the nature of the evidence impacts its relevance. No arbitral authority has been provided which supports the proposition that the observations of a private investigator hired to observe the actions of an employee is inadmissible or that there be an exclusion of that investigator’s notes of the observations made. Furthermore, if the investigator takes pictures of the employee, such evidence is admissible. It is only the videotape (moving pictures) that seems to be the type of evidence in which arbitrators say the employer has gone too far.

I also am of the view that the right to privacy, however it may arise, is not germane to this issue. If the right exists, and I take no view at this time as to whether it does or does not, it can be pursued for its infringement. If an employee has such a right and this right has been infringed then, in the context of a collective agreement, it can be pursued as a grievance and a remedy for the infringement of the right can be fashioned by an arbitrator.

The employer was represented by Mike Fitzgibbon of Thoughts from a Management Lawyer.

Re Ready Bake Foods Inc. and United Food and Commercial Workers International Union, Local 175, [2009] O.L.A.A. No. 308 (Raymond).

Case Report – Court orders plaintiff to list relevant documents contained in Facebook site

Those following the litigation of production disputes related to Facebook pages will be interested in the Ontario Superior Court of Justice’s July 6th order in Wice v. Dominion of Canada General Insurance Co.

After hearing a motion in this motor vehicle accident claim, Boswell J. ordered the plaintiff to include relevant documents from his Facebook account in a further and better affidavit of documents, granted the defendant leave to cross-examine the plaintiff on the affidavit and ordered the plaintiff to preserve all information in his Facebook account for the duration of litigation. He followed the Court’s now well-known decision in Leduc v. Roman.

Wice v. Dominion of Canada General Insurance Co., 2009 CanLII 36310 (ON S.C.).

Case Report – Whistle-blower leaks privileged report to Crown… charges stayed

Today, the Ontario Court of Appeal allowed an appeal of a noteworthy case about breach of privilege by the Crown.

The case involves an investigation report prepared at the request of external legal counsel after a critical injury for which Occupational Health and Safety Act charges were ultimately laid. An employee who was given a draft of the report on the undertaking he destroy it gave a copy to the Crown. This was after the company had asserted privilege to the Ministry inspector, who had agreed not to order the report’s production.

When the Crown disclosed the report to the company in its Stinchcombe production the company immediately objected, and at trial moved before a justice of the peace for a declaration (that the report was privileged) and a stay. It initially succeeded in obtaining a declaration, a stay and an order for $38,000 in legal costs. On appeal to a judge, the Court overturned the stay and the costs order. It held that the proper remedy for breach of the defendants’ section 8 rights was an order excluding the report and that the motion for a stay based on prejudice to trial fairness was premature.

In allowing the appeal, the Court of Appeal started by minimizing a statement made by the justice of the peace about the reporting being “primarily informational.” It held the lower court had found the report was subject to solicitor-client privilege and that this point was not challenged in the appeal.

The Court of Appeal then held that the presumption of prejudice endorsed by a majority of the Supreme Court of Canada in Celanese applies when the Crown comes into possession of a defendant’s solicitor-client communications:

Counsel for the Crown in this court sought to distinguish Celanese on the basis that it was a civil case in which the appellants were “attempting to utilize a civil onus to achieve a criminal result”. I reject this submission. In my view, the above cases support the proposition that when the Crown comes into possession of a defence document that is protected by solicitor-client and litigation privilege, prejudice to the defence will be presumed. The presumption, however, is rebuttable.

On the facts, the Court of Appeal held that a stay was the appropriate remedy. The basis for the finding is narrow. It stressed that the justice of the peace had made a specific finding that the report set out items that could be used to the disadvantage and prejudice of the defendants and held that the Crown had not led any evidence about its distribution and use of the report to rebut the inference.

R v. Bruce Power, 2009 ONCA 573.

Information Roundup – 13 July 2009

Other than the case law I’ve posted on, here’s what I’ve been reading since the last Roundup on July 5th: 

Every so often I re-jig my approach to digesting information from the web. Since I started on Twitter in January I’ve found it great for picking up on current affairs. I’ve liked the “living index” quality of Twitter so much that I’ve really been far too neglectful of RSS feeds – pretty much mass deleting everything rather than keeping up and digesting.

About a week ago I went back and did some serious weeding of my NewsGator feeds and eliminated any feeds that only broadcast the type of information I’m likely to get through Twitter. At the top of my new “desert island” list is the University of Calgary’s “ABlawg,” which struck a chord with the two posts linked above. I also like Foley Hoag’s Security, Privacy and the Law, Littler’s Workplace Privacy Counsel, Proskauer Rose’s Privacy Law Blog and K&L Gates’ Electronic Discovery Law blog via RSS.

Take care!

Dan

Case Report – Nova Scotia judgment a sign of things to come on litigation and non-party privacy?

On June 30th, the Nova Scotia Supreme Court issued a judgment in which it dismissed a motion for production of documents. Though a routine motion, the Court’s reasoning may demonstrate a more modern approach to production in civil disputes, and one arguably invited by the pending changes to Ontario’s Rules of Civil Procedure.

The plaintiffs brought a motion for production in furtherance of their action against an investment dealer and an individual investment advisor. They sought documents pertaining to complaints brought by other clients against the advisor based on a claim that the dealer failed to supervise the advisor. The Court applied the “semblance of relevance” test called for by Nova Scotia’s now-replaced Civil Procedure Rules and held that the records should not be produced. Though it framed its analysis as being about relevance, the Court clearly weighed the relative value of production against its impact on non-party privacy:

In my view, the documents pertaining to other clients’ trading accounts handled by Mr. Bagnell under Mr. Youden’s supervision fail to meet the test of relevancy. Similar act evidence of this sort has little probative value to an examination of the handling of the plaintiffs’ trading accounts and in my opinion, is not necessary for disposing fairly of the proceeding. The subject allegation of inadequate supervision, whether framed in negligence or as a breach of fiduciary duty or breach of contract, will require the court to determine the appropriate standard of care and/or scope of fiduciary duty owed to the plaintiffs. That is going to be informed largely by evidence of industry standards and practices, the workplace manuals of RBCDS pertaining thereto (which already have been produced), the contract between the parties, and perhaps the introduction of expert opinion evidence. How Mr. Youden supervised the trading accounts of other clients of Mr. Bagnell would have little probative value in this determination, especially where different clients often have different investment objectives and risk tolerances in their trading activities. I am simply not persuaded that the production of these records would likely lead to the discovery of admissible evidence in this action…

The second reason for denying this application is based on confidentiality concerns. If the documents sought were ordered to be produced, there would be some unknown number and identity of other clients whose personal financial affairs would now be disclosed in this litigation, unbeknownst to them. Personal financial information is a very private and sensitive subject to most individuals. While I recognize that the implied undertaking rule would offer some protection, confidentiality concerns nonetheless remain and in the absence of any compelling argument of relevance such that the production of these documents is necessary for disposing fairly of the proceeding, those confidentiality concerns become an added reason for the dismissal of this application.

This is arguably the type of reasoning that will be invited when Ontario’s new Rules of Civil Procedure come into force on January 1, 2010. The landmark changes to the Rules will be brought in by O. Reg 438/08. This amending regulation will establish proportionality as a governing principle for interpreting the Rules, establish bare relevance as the threshold for production and establish a list of factors that a judge or master should consider in making discovery-related orders. The amendments do not expressly contemplate protection of non-party privacy as a relevant factor, and the impetus to the Rule changes (the Osborne Report) is primarily about affordability of civil justice as between parties to litigation. The changes do, however, invite a more nuanced approach to civil production, and the balancing of non-party privacy interests reflected in this Nova Scotia case may become more common.

MacGowan v. RBC Dominion Securities Inc., 2008 NSSC 421.

Information Roundup – 5 July 2009

Here are my recent links of note from June 22nd.

If you’re interested in the law relating to corporate e-mail systems, be sure to check out Stengart v. Loving Care Agency Inc., linked through the fifth bullet below. It’s a New Jersey case about whether an employee waived privilege in solicitor-client communications by sending them through a personal internet-based e-mail account on a work computer. The e-mails were recovered by the employer, who claimed it could use them in post-employment litigation with the employee. The Court makes some extremely strong statements against employer control over “personal” communications on work systems – some of the strongest I’ve read.

I find the reasoning in Stengart troubling, but am withholding an opinion pending further thought. What’s immediately remarkable to me, however, is how value-laden these e-mail judgements are. Try reading the Alberta Court of Appeal’s recent Poliquin decision and Stengart back-to-back and you’ll see what I mean. This is not good in my view. As a management side advisor and advocate I’m not inclined to promote the enactment of privacy legislation, but if we are going to have enforceable privacy rights, enacting good and balanced privacy legislation might be a way to make such rights understandable. Without predictability, policy-making will be difficult and litigation of reasonable positions might be prohibited by risks that cannot be controlled. These thoughts to be continued at a later date.

On a personal note, Seanna and I are new parents of Penelope Green Robinson. She was born two days ago and is very healthy. “Green” is from Joni Mitchell’s song “Little Green” – a lovely (though sad) song about a mother’s love for child. Here’s a pic of PG and her brother Bug, who has been very welcoming. As for me, I’m feeling very grateful for my family and for the wonders of life.

See ya!

Dan

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Case Report – Court affirms Anton Piller in departing employee case

On May 5th, the Alberta Court of Queen’s Bench for affirmed an Anton Piller order that permitted a search of business premises and private residences and seizure of materials and information related to a departing employee claim.

There is a three-part test for the making of an Anton Piller order: (1) there must be an extremely strong prima facie case; (2) the potential or actual damage to the applicant must be very serious; and (3) clear evidence that the defendants have incriminating evidence in their possession and that there is a real possibility they may destroy such material.

The Court examined the mixed jurisprudence on the “serious harm” element and held that it requires proof of procedural rather than financial harm. That is, an applicant must demonstrate that its proposed order will preserve evidence without which it could not prove its case. The Court reasoned that the purpose of the extraordinary order is to preserve evidence and that irreparable financial harm can be addressed through an ordinary injunction:

As discussed, the adverse financial impact approach considers potential harm that may be visited upon the plaintiff as a result of the use of the proprietary or confidential information that the defendant has or may have in its possession. If this is the type of damage that the plaintiff seeks to enjoin, then an injunction may suffice without the need for the court to exercise the extraordinary power of granting an Anton Piller Order. As noted by Hoffmann J. in 1268 Lock International Plc. v. Beswick and Others, [1989] 1 W.L.R. 1268 at 1281, Anton Piller orders reside at the “absolute extremity of the court’s powers”. For that reason, they should only be granted in circumstances which demand their imposition. Those circumstances would have to include more than the desire to enjoin certain activities which could be accomplished through much less intrusive methods. They must include a need to preserve evidence without which the plaintiff’s claim could not be proven.

The Court held that the applicant met its burden of proving serious harm even though it had copies of the information taken and (presumably) evidence showing it was taken. The Court suggested that the applicant would also need forensic evidence about how its information was stored and maintained on the defendants’ computers to prove misuse of confidential information: “[Making out its case] would include showing where the information was taken and how it was used or altered.”

The Court also engaged in a detailed analysis of the evidence to determine whether the applicant had established a “real possibility” of destruction based on a “compelling inference.” There is a policy lesson in this part of the judgement for employers who are likely to be faced with claims by departing employees who take electronically-stored confidential information and claim they deleted it because they realized that taking it was wrong. In the face of such a defence, the Court drew an inference that destruction of evidence was a possibility based partly on the applicant’s good information management practices. It said:

I am satisfied that on all of the circumstances in relation to this point there is a basis upon which to draw a strong inference of dishonesty. Particularly compelling is the fact that Higham took the documents in the face of his supervisor’s warning and an employment agreement he executed prohibiting him from copying or transmitting “[a]ll notes, records, working papers, files, research material or literature accumulated or developed” while at CCS…

Secure argued that the e-mails Higham deleted and the CD-Rom he destroyed was not “evidence” when it was destroyed because there was no Statement of Claim yet issued or because the litigation had not yet commenced. Belzil J. in Netsmart considered the destruction of documents before litigation had commenced in relation to this arm of the test. In any event, Higham knew he was in possession of documents that he should not have had and he chose to destroy them. Even if the destruction was in good faith as he claims, a point upon which I make no finding, it does not mitigate the risk of his destroying further CCS documents in his possession. In other words, he was given to destroying documents that were improperly in his possession. Regardless of his motives the fact that he did this at least twice indicates that it may well happen again. As stated by Richard A.C.J. in Adobe, at para 89: “It cannot now be argued that the plaintiffs should be denied an Anton Piller type order preserving evidence when that evidence was in fact destroyed.”

While this passage highlights the applicant’s good information management practices, the applicant also suffered for agreeing to give another of its departing employees his work laptop in return for a promise to make a charitable donation and then failing to wipe the laptop when requested by the employee. The Court held that it could not draw any negative inference from the employee’s deletion of over 4,000 e-mails in these circumstances because the this action was consistent with the actions of an honest employee who wanted to rid himself of his employer’s e-mails. As a result, the Court revised the order to exclude the laptop.

The plaintiff brought a cross-motion to deal with the scope and form of production of information from a number of seized hard drives. The award discusses the protcol by which the parties will deal with production but is not very directive as it appears they were in substantial agreement on how to proceed.

CCS Corp. v. Secure Energey Services Inc., 2009 ABQB 275 (CanLII).

Case Report – Strong words on employers’ interest in controlling employee computer use by the Alberta C.A.

The Alberta Court of Appeal’s June 22nd judgement in Poliquin v. Devon Canada Corporation is not a privacy judgement, but contains some very strong dicta supporting employers’ interest in controlling employee use of their computer systems.

The case is about an employer that terminated a long-service supervisor for, among other things, sending and receiving pornographic and racist e-mails. In holding the employee’s wrongful dismissal claim ought to be dismissed summarily, the Court of Appeal made the following remarks:

It is important to situate a document like the Code of Conduct in the larger workplace context. Employers have the right to set the ethical, professional and operational standards for their workplaces. Doing so not only falls within an employer’s management rights, it also constitutes an integral component of corporate good governance. The workplace is not an employee’s home; and employees have no reasonable expectation of privacy in their workplace computers. It therefore follows that while employers may permit employees limited personal use of workplace computers, the employer is entitled to restrict the terms and conditions on which that use may be permitted. Devon did just that. Employees are permitted to use Devon’s equipment “for limited personal use”, but such use must be in compliance with the Code of Conduct: App. Key Evidence, Vol. 1, A83. The Code of Conduct expressly provides that prohibited use of e-mail includes “[s]ending…pornographic, obscene, inappropriate or other objectionable messages or attachments via e-mail to anyone”: App. Key Evidence, Vol. 1, A83. Further, harassment is defined under the Code of Conduct as including “[v]isual conduct such as pornographic or derogatory…e-mails…”: App. Key Evidence, Vol. 1, A80.

Employers have good reason to be concerned about the misuse of their equipment and resources in order to access, receive and disseminate pornographic or racist material. The potential for harm to an organization flowing from this kind of misconduct is great. It can easily poison a work environment, thereby denying equal employment opportunities to others: Backman v. Maritime Paper Products Ltd., 2008 NBQB 219 (CanLII), 2008 NBQB 219, 67 C.C.E.L. (3d) 261 at paras. 9-11. Since work is an essential aspect of an individual’s personal life, an employer owes obligations to all employees in its organization. It cannot turn a blind eye to discrimination or harassment in its workplace: Menagh v. Hamilton (City), [2005] O.T.C. 898 at paras. 46 & 287 (S.C.J.), aff’d 2007 ONCA 244 (CanLII), 2007 ONCA 244. As the Ontario Court of Appeal recognized in Gonsalves v. Catholic Church Extension Society of Canada 1998 CanLII 7152 (ON C.A.), (1998), 164 D.L.R. (4th) 339 at para. 10, 39 C.C.E.L. (2d) 104, an employer “has a duty to all the employees both to end the [sexual harassment] and to alleviate its impact upon the employment environment.” See also Tellier v. Bank of Montreal reflex, (1987), 17 C.C.E.L. 1 at 12 (Ont. Dist. Ct.), where the Court recognized that an employer has “a heavy responsibility to protect its employees.”

If an employer fails to act, it faces a significant risk of actions by employees who are subjected to discrimination or harassment – and properly so: see for example Robichaud v. Canada (Treasury Board), 1987 CanLII 73 (S.C.C.), [1987] 2 S.C.R. 84 , 40 D.L.R. (4th) 577; Janzen v. Platy Enterprises Ltd., 1989 CanLII 97 (S.C.C.), [1989] 1 S.C.R. 1252, 59 D.L.R. (4th) 352; Bannister v. General Motors of Canada Ltd. 1998 CanLII 7151 (ON C.A.), (1998), 164 D.L.R. (4th) 325 at para. 20, 39 C.C.E.L. (2d) 91 (Ont. C.A.); and Tellier at p. 12. Therefore, employers are fully justified in taking proactive steps, including the adoption of codes of conduct, to curtail and prevent improper conduct.

There are other negative consequences an employer may suffer when an employee misuses its equipment and resources for pornographic or racist purposes. The reputation of an employer in the business and wider community can be seriously compromised when even one employee engages in this kind of behaviour, particularly where that employee holds a senior supervisory position. It can also adversely impact on the work – and work ethic – of the employee in question given the very real risk that the misuse will occur in whole or in part on the employer’s time. And then there is the threat to a company’s information technology systems. Computer operating systems can be infected with worms and viruses introduced through inappropriate accessing of pornographic and racist websites or through receiving tainted material downloaded from these websites. In addition to these concerns, this kind of misconduct increases the risk that other ethical and professional boundaries will, by reason of the employer’s perceived tolerance of the original misconduct, be more readily crossed, not only by the affected employee, but by others within the organization, or even perhaps outside it (like suppliers to a company).

In summary, an employee’s misuse of a workplace computer for pornographic or racist purposes negatively affects an employer’s professional, ethical and operational integrity. Employers are not required to tolerate the misuse of their computers and Internet access any more than they are required to put up with serious incidents of dishonesty by employees. When an employee steals money from an employer, the theft and resulting damage is at least confined to that employee. But where dissemination of pornographic or racist material using the employer’s computer or Internet access is concerned and especially where the employee’s e-mail address includes the employer’s identity, this is not necessarily so. In the information technology world today, e-mail can be disseminated to many inside and outside an organization with the click of a mouse. Accordingly, the harm done may well be far more serious and pervasive. This reality substantially increases the risks to employers flowing from the misuse of their equipment and Internet access for improper purposes. For these reasons, an employer is entitled not only to prohibit use of its equipment and systems for pornographic or racist purposes but also to monitor an employee’s use of the employer’s equipment and resources to ensure compliance.

Please forgive the lengthy quote, but it is a fairly powerful excerpt and handy to us management lawyers.

For Michael Fitzgibbon’s excellent discussion of Poliquin and the availability of summary judgement in wrongful dismissal cases, see here.

Poliquin v. Devon Canada Corp., 2009 ABCA 216.

Information Roundup – 22 June 2009

Here are the links I’ve tweeted since the last Roundup:

Been going very hard lately. I think summer is supposed to be a time for a little catch up, but I probably agreed to take on a few too many speaking engagements and had a couple of big matters to handle at the same time. I do find getting out and speaking a good way of learning though, and I have no regrets about my last month in that regard.

On the personal front, we’re expecting our second child very shortly. It’s about time, because Hugo (below) seems two going on ten. I just talk to him like an adult now, ’cause he seems to understand everything. Big vocabulary too – good words and bad!

The baby’s due just after Canada Day, and I’m heading out solo to our friends Dave and Janie’s wedding on Cape Breton island that weekend. A certain disaster waiting to happen, but rushing back to TO could also make for a good story. We’ve never been good at keeping things simple!

Take care and enjoy the links!

Dan

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  1. Port and Popsicles on the back porch. So good an experience I should sell tickets!4 minutes ago from web

  2. Liked Mike Fitzgibbon’s Summary Judgement in Employment Disputes: http://bit.ly/PHB7y5 minutes ago from web

  3. Thank you for the RT@MAllinotte!23 minutes ago from web

  4. RT @slaw_dot_ca New post on Slaw: The Justice Reporter http://tinyurl.com/lqy4fn Printed a copy for review. Looks good.23 minutes ago from web

  5. Supremely secret: top [Canadian] court wants law clerks muzzled: http://bit.ly/YhW8J Not a hard find, but interesting.37 minutes ago from web

  6. Interesting case on ER vicarious liability for EE privacy misdeed: http://tinyurl.com/lcqs3g Via @privacylaw7:10 PM Jun 21st from TwitterBerry

  7. Nice day in TO. Morning at Riverdale farm and then a paddle out around Leslie Spit.3:53 PM Jun 21st from mobile web

  8. Good TO Portlands experience this am. Windsurf sesh followed by splash in the pool at Mayfair. Feeling human now.1:04 PM Jun 20th from web

  9. Reading The Court’s Privacy is Dead post: http://bit.ly/13d1Ee8:20 PM Jun 19th from web

  10. “Crown brief” production judgement by the BCCA: http://bit.ly/cxmdV [Still unpacking this, but have recorded the essence.]4:43 PM Jun 19th from web

  11. Congrats! RT @wenlib Trying to focus – too excited about the new job. I’m going to be the Manager of client services at the Leg Library…3:54 PM Jun 19th from web

  12. @privacylawyer Yes, we’re getting lots of mileage out of it. Can’t wait to hear your views over a beer some day…no tape recorder present!7:34 AM Jun 19th from web

  13. John Gregory pushes back on my comment on the scope of privacy rights and Raitt at @slaw_dot_com: http://bit.ly/flBni5:45 AM Jun 19th from web

  14. @erikmagraken on today’s Crown brief production case from the BCCA: http://tinyurl.com/lcqs3g Thx Erik!7:41 PM Jun 18th from TwitterBerry

  15. @dominicjaar Nice gig, I’d say!7:33 PM Jun 18th from mobile web

  16. Commented on the @a_cameron post on the Raitt tape case @slaw_dot_ca: http://bit.ly/flBni1:46 PM Jun 18th from web

  17. Thanks @pensionlawyer and @sectorprivate. Further developed thoughts (sort of) here: http://bit.ly/t0BDG10:52 AM Jun 18th from web

  18. Privacy guy’s awesome digest is up: http://bit.ly/IKKYh5:23 AM Jun 18th from TweetDeck

  19. And on a more serious note, great OBA dinner on search and seizure. Prof Austen drew an nice link between R. v. Patrick and Internet privacy8:32 PM Jun 17th from web

  20. @beermile Very flattered by the comparison to Bobby Riggs, but your assumption about my fitness level might be too generous!8:31 PM Jun 17th from web

  21. Thank you @smireau and @helply. Here’s the privacy wheel, posted by @privacynow from down under:http://twitpic.com/4b0f112:29 PM Jun 17th from web

  22. I recall following someone who created this great “privacy wheel,” an internal communication/training aid. Can you help me find it?9:27 AM Jun 17th from web

  23. Decided to attend this OBA dinner program on search and seizure tonight. Looks good. If you’re in TO, check it out: http://bit.ly/2loDMz8:14 AM Jun 17th from web

  24. RT @beermile Beermile.com just surpassed 10,000 entries. (via @doctorfantastic)10:13 PM Jun 16th from mobile web

  25. Thanks for this (on U. Illinois admissions suit) @PrivacyLaw – http://tinyurl.com/l5hkdu9:47 PM Jun 16th from TwitterBerry

  26. Reminded of this timeless article in an firm project. Forget the Windup and Make the Pitch: http://bit.ly/mnPHV8:05 AM Jun 16th from web

  27. Added short addendum to Ontario IPC personal e-mails case: http://bit.ly/w4sTA5:47 AM Jun 16th from TweetDeck

  28. Tandem appeals in Prime Minister’s agenda book matter come in against public access: http://bit.ly/kkKEu8:58 PM Jun 15th from TweetDeck

  29. Paddleboarders prepared to pack it on: http://bit.ly/14fVSH7:54 PM Jun 15th from TweetDeck

  30. Final argument in big matter (for me) today. Exhausted. Fulfilled.7:22 PM Jun 15th from mobile web

  31. Student appeals and higher education student affairs issues: http://bit.ly/i2agF Good presentation/discussion this morn. Materials here.2:47 PM Jun 14th from TweetDeck

  32. Like a couple from the @eschaeff “at the blogs” including the one from @AdamsDrafting on bad words in contracts. http://bit.ly/1pWMAa5:49 AM Jun 14th from TweetDeck

  33. Got it! http://www.facebook.com/dan…7:54 AM Jun 13th from web

  34. Case Report – Raitt “lost recorder” judgement published: http://bit.ly/t0BDG [Leading the way for bizarre privacy case of the year!]9:33 PM Jun 12th from web

  35. Thanks for the FF @erikmagraken, @omarharedeye, @berskinparr and @sectorprivate. Enjoy your weekends!7:29 PM Jun 12th from web

  36. #followfriday @jordan_law21 for the free advice on the use of “wither” and “whither.” Thanks again Jordan!7:27 PM Jun 12th from web

  37. The CBA has published its new Privacy Pages newsletter: http://bit.ly/m6d7011:13 AM Jun 12th from web

  38. RT @RalphLosey Supreme Court Won’t Hear Case Over Computer Tech’s Right To Search Your Computer http://bit.ly/CUxXa6:43 AM Jun 12th from web

  39. Off to Rethink Breast Cancer’s “Romp”. Should be fun!5:42 PM Jun 11th from mobile web

  40. Posted e-mail law presentation here: http://bit.ly/adTfs Found today very useful. Good presentation by @a_cameron and others!4:17 PM Jun 11th from web