Lawyer’s communications with witnesses to harassment privileged, privileged waived

4 Mar

In late June of last year, Arbitrator Moore held that communications between a lawyer retained to investigate a harassment complaint and various bargaining unit members were subject to solicitor-client privilege, but that the employer waived privilege by relying on the investigator’s conclusions in its discipline letter.

The employer used a very strong retainer letter that clearly established the investigator’s mandate was to gather facts and evidence for the purpose of providing legal advice. The letter (admitted into evidence by the Union without challenge) was sufficient to establish that the sought-after communications were privileged. Significantly, Arbitrator Moore held that communications with unionized employees undertaken for the purpose of providing legal advice can still be privileged communications:

Thus, I have not been referred to any authority that supports the proposition that employees, by virtue of being unionized, are to be regarded as third parties.  While the legal rights of unionized employees are certainly impacted by the exclusive representational rights accorded to unions by statute, and may be further altered by collective agreement provisions, the employees are, in my view, still fundamentally employees of the employer.Accordingly, I do not find the fact that the employees are unionized to be a relevant consideration.  It does not alter my conclusion that they are not third parties.  The communications between the lawyer and the employees, therefore, took place within the relationship between the solicitor and the client and fall within the scope of the privilege.

Arbitrator Moore also rejected a very bold argument from the union that arbitrators should apply a distinct concept of solicitor-client privilege that provides “practical labour relations results for the participants.” Arbitrator Moore reasoned that the license given to labour arbitrators was not so broad “as to abrogate a principle as fundamental and protected as solicitor-client privilege.”

Although the employer established solicitor-client privilege and did not seek to rely on the investigator’s report at arbitration, Arbitrator Moore held that it waived privilege by relying on the investigator’s conclusion in its disciplinary letter. The letter read as follows:

The investigator concluded that your  conduct towards the complainant violated  Metro Vancouver’s Workplace Harassment Prevention Policy and directly contributed to a detrimental  work  environment  for  the  complainant  while he  was  employed  by  Metro Vancouver. Specifically, the investigator found that you were responsible for creating a harassing and discriminatory posting about the complainant and placing it in the Coquitlam guard house. In addition, the investigator found that you made discriminatory and harassing statements about the complainant in the work place. The investigator also concluded that you were not fully forthcoming with him during the investigation process. We accept the investigators [sic] findings and conclusions regarding your conduct. We conclude that your behaviour has been both discriminatory towards the complainant and has also violated Metro Vancouver’s expectations of appropriate employee behaviour.

As effective as the employer’s retainer letter was at establishing privilege, the employer’s discipline letter was a clear invitation to a waiver finding. This employer’s efforts nonetheless leaves other employers with a good road map for investigating sensitive internal matters under the protection of solicitor-client privilege. The retainer letter used by the employer is included in the award. It is a good model.

Vancouver (Regional District) v Greater Vancouver Regional District Employees’ Union, 2015 CanLII 87692 (BC LA).

Party can call evidence about contents of lost video

4 Mar

On January 22nd, Vice-Chair Harris of the (Ontario) Grievance Settlement Board held that an employer can call testimony from witnesses who had viewed a video tape before it was inadvertently destroyed. He held that exclusion was an inappropriate remedy for inadvertent spoliation given the employer’s case rested on the proposed evidence. He also held that the proposed evidence was not hearsay and was not excluded because the best evidence was unavailable.

The overwhelming strength of the authorities is that such secondary evidence is admissible when the trier of fact is satisfied that the original existed, has been lost or destroyed and a proper explanation has been given of the absence of the better evidence. Here, that explanation has been given and accepted by the union.

Ontario Public Service Employees Union (Phagau) v Ontario (Liquor Control Board of Ontario), 2016 CanLII 7445 (ON GSB).

The five ways of a strong privacy officer

2 Mar

It has been a few years since Carswell published its Managing Personal Information text, but this morning I had cause to look up a chapter on information governance that I contributed. I had forgotten about what I had written about the qualities of a privacy officer, but liked what I read and thought I would share it here.

Acting in support of self-policing is not an easy role. With this in mind, here is a list of good behaviors for privacy officers to demonstrate:

  • Flexibility. Privacy officers should understand that few things required by privacy statutes are black and white and should be prepared to accommodate reasonable business risk.
  • Creativity. Privacy officers should be prepared to help line managers think creatively about how to manage around privacy-related constraints in a responsible manner.
  • Benign skepticism. Privacy officers should give others the benefit of the doubt, while also looking diligently for objective evidence of non-compliance.
  • Fairness and consistency. Privacy officers should take an even-handed approach to their duties, treating all departments and employees in a principled and objective manner. They should deal with similar scenarios in similar ways.
  • Empathy. Privacy officers should communicate the rules with a view to helping audience members comply and should be understanding of audience members’ business demands.

Privacy officers should strive to foster and protect their credibility with line management. This involves demonstrating unwavering commitment to the principles underlying their privacy programs, yet a willingness to apply those principles in a manner that invites respect and keeps “doors open.”

Thank you Claudiu Popa for involving me in your book project. For more about Managing Personal Information and to purchase a copy see here.

Criminal reference checks for current hospital employees ruled improper

14 Feb

In a decision from last May that just came to my attention, Arbitrator Stout ruled that a hospital’s policy that required all current employees to undertake vulnerable sector criminal record checks violated its nurses collective agreement. 

Although British Columbia legislation supports periodic checks on vulnerable sector employees, the hospital’s policy was first of its kind in the Ontario hospital sector. Ontario employer’s have had difficulty justifying such checks. Arbitrator Picher’s comment about the distinction between pre-employment and in-employment checks in City of Ottawa is both authoritative and restrictive. 

The person who presents himself or herself at the door of a business or other institution to be hired does so as a stranger. At that point the employer knows little or nothing about the person who is no more than a job applicant. In my view, the same cannot be said of an individual who has, for a significant period of time, been an employee under the supervision of management. The employment relationship presupposes a degree of ongoing, and arguably increasing, familiarity with the qualities and personality of the individual employee. The employer, through its managers and supervisors, is not without reasonable means to make an ongoing assessment of the fitness of the individual for continued employment, including such factors as his or her moral rectitude, to the extent that it can be determined from job performance, relationships with supervisors and other employees, and such other information as may incidentally come to the attention of the employer through the normal social exchanges that are common to most workplaces. On the whole, therefore, the extraordinary waiver of privacy which may be justified when a stranger is hired is substantially less compelling as applied to an employee with many months, or indeed many years, of service.

Mr. Picher did state that in-employment checks can be used for employees exercising “particularly sensitive functions.” 

In this case, Arbitrator Stout held that the employer had not proven a “current problem” or “real risk.” Arbitrator Stout was also significantly influenced by the structural problem with vulnerable sector checks – i.e. they return sensitive “non-conviction information” for which employers generally have no need.

Rouge Valley Health System v Ontario Nurses’ Association, 2015 CanLII 24422 (ON LA).

Arbitrator deems name tag policy to be unlawful

13 Feb

On December 11th of last year, arbitrator Allen Ponak held that a policy requiring health care workers to wear name tags bearing a photo and their full name was unlawful. 

The policy applied to licensed practical nurses and health care aides among others. The employer implemented the policy to support “respect and accountability” in service delivery and to “equalize the power between patient and caregivers.” Mr Ponak explained, “Employees know all about patients; by providing last names patients now have some knowledge about their caregivers.”

Mr. Ponak accepted the employer’s objective as legitimate, but his decision rested significantly on the employer’s failure to “offer any objective evidence to support the proposition that making it easy for patients and family members to know the full name of the caregivers improved the delivery of healthcare or the patient experience.” Mr. Ponak, did not consider whether the name tag policy had an important symbolic benefit, though it does not appear the employer raised such an argument.

The employer’s “weak justification” did not outweigh the impact of the policy on employees, which Mr. Ponak acknowledged was not substantial. He therefore held the policy was unreasonable and implemented in breach of the collective agreement. 

More concerning is Mr. Ponak’s finding that the policy breached the Saskatchewan Local Authority Freedom of Information and Protection of Privacy Act despite an authorizing provision that invites deference to a head’s judgement on disclosures made in the name of the public interest and another authorizing provision thats purpose is to foster public service accountability. Mr. Ponak did note that the employer did not argue these provisions.

Neither side presented “objective evidence” to support its position, making this a difficult and important contest of principle about workplace norms. Other arbitrators could go the other way. Also, appeal to empirical evidence linking positive patient perceptions to the disclosure of provider indentities should push the balance in employers’ favour. 

Prairie North Health Region v Canadian Union of Public Employees, Local 5111, 2015 CanLII 85338 (SK LA).

Wellness be dammed – universal medical assessments not allowed

31 Dec

On November 12th, Arbitrator Dorsey held that an employer could not implement universal “fitness for duty” testing.

The program would require drivers responsible for carrying liquid and compressed gas to be tested once every five years. The employer framed the testing as fitness for duty testing, but the program featured urinalysis and bloodwork to look for “disorders, including anemia, infection and leukemia.” In other words, the program looked (at least partly) rooted in the promotion of wellness, though requiring employees to participate in a wellness program with an (invasive) medical assessment feature is aggressive by Canadian standards, if not unprecedented.

Arbitrator Dorsey appeared to appreciate this problem, and decided the matter by finding that the particular collective agreement provision upon which the employer relied did not have the “clear and express language” necessary to authorize universal testing. He also said that truck transportation is not so safety sensitive an endeavour “regardless of the nature of the product being transported” to justify an exception to normal preference for individualized, for cause testing.

Teamsters Local Union No 213 v Linde Canada Limited, 2015 CanLII 73757 (BC LA).

Arbitrator dismisses video surveillance grievance, makes principled statements

15 Dec

On November 12th, British Columbia labour arbitrator Stan Lanyon dismissed a policy grievance that challenged the implementation of a video surveillance system in an equipment production and maintenance plant.

Surveillance cases are driven by their facts, but Arbitrator Lanyon did dismiss a union argument that overt and covert surveillance are equally invasive: “covert surveillance is more a more egregious violation of privacy because it is capable of causing more distress, anguish and embarrassment.”

As significantly, he held that surveillance systems can be justified without evidence of “a past history of serious breaches of safety, or security issues.”

Finally, Arbitrator Lanyon recognized a difference between using cameras for disciplinary (or supervisory) purposes and using video surveillance footage in the investigation of incidents. This distinction is not clearly drawn in some case law (and employer policies), but is important.

Kadant Carmanah Design v International Association of Machinists and Aerospace Workers, District 250, 2015 CanLII 79278 (BC LA).

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