Tag: breach notification

Alberta OIPC finds Blackbaud incident gives rise to RROSH

Hat tip to my good colleague Francois Joli-Coeur, who let our group know yesterday that the OIPC Alberta has issued a number of breach notification decisions about the Blackbaud incident, finding in each one that it gave rise to a “real risk of significant harm” that warrants notification and reporting under Alberta PIPA.

Blackbaud is a cloud service provider to organizations engaged in fundraising who suffered a ransomware incident last spring in which hackers exfiltrated the personal information of donors and educational institution alumni. The true scope of the incident is unknown, but likely large, affecting millions of individuals across the globe.

Blackbaud issued notably strong communications that de-emphasized the risk of harm. It rested primarily on the payment of a ransom, assurances by the threat actors that they would delete all data in exchange for payment and its ongoing dark web searches. Most affected institutions (Blackbaud clients) notified anyway.

On my count the OIPC issued seven breach notification decisions about the incident late last year, each time finding a “real risk.” In a decision involving an American college with donors or alumni in Alberta, the OIPC said:

In my view, a reasonable person would consider the likelihood of significant harm resulting from this incident is increased because the personal information was compromised due to a deliberate unauthorized intrusion by a cybercriminal. The Organization reported that the cybercriminal both accessed and stole the personal information at issue. The Organization can only assume that cybercriminal did not or will not misuse, disseminate or otherwise make available publicly the personal information at issue.

This is not surprising, but tells us how the OIPC feels about the assurance gained from paying a ransom to recover stolen data.

See e.g. P2020-ND-201 (File #017205).

IPC/Ontario – Appropriate for hospital to notify of breach because it maintained a shared EMR

The IPC/Ontario has issued a significant decision about information governance under the Personal Health Information Protection Act. Specifically, it held that a hospital that gives a physician access to an electronic medical record for use in private practice is a health information custodian together with the physician, but that it can retain a duty to notify of a breach arising out of the private practice.

Background

The hospital maintained an EMR system and gave access to its credentialed physicians and their employees for use in private practice. Employees in two such private practices accessed EMRs without authorization. The hospital notified affected patients and reported the breach to the IPC, which led the IPC to investigate.

In the course of investigation it came to light that some of the employees had shared their login credentials with others outside of the hospital, but apparently to enable health care. The employees also apparently accessed some records (for non-health care purposes) with the consent of friends of family members. Both of these actions violated hospital policy.

Decision

The IPC held that the access enabled by credential sharing and the access made with the consent of family members was made in breach of PHIPA. Although a more benign form of unauthorized access, the IPC found a breach based on section 10(2) of PHIPA, which states, “A health information custodian shall comply with its information practices.”

Regarding the identity of the custodian, the IPC held that both the hospital and the two private practice physicians were custodians in the circumstances – the physicians being custodians “when they access patient information in [the EMR] for the purpose of privatizing health care to their private practice patients.” Such access, the IPC explained, invites a disclosure by the hospital and a collection by the physicians; in this context the physicians were not the hospitals’ agents.

Despite the physicians’ custodianship, the IPC held it was appropriate for the hospital to notify in the circumstances. It said:

[122]   In the cases under review, THP and the private practice physicians also treated THP as the health information custodian responsible for notifying affected individuals of the private practice employees’ unauthorized accesses in THP’s EMR. In these circumstances, I agree that THP was the appropriate party to give notice under section 12(2) of PHIPA. As the health information custodian who maintains the EMR, THP was best placed to discover and investigate the extent of the employees’ activity in the EMR, identify all the parties whose personal health information had been accessed without authority, and initiate contact with these individuals, all of whom are THP patients, but some of whom may not have any relationship with the particular private practice physician for whom the employee worked. In these cases, notification by THP was appropriate, taking into account not only the language of section 12(2)[29] but also the interests of the affected individuals.

[123]   I also agree with THP that in some circumstances, notification by the collecting custodian may be more appropriate, and a reasonable approach to fulfilling the notice obligation in section 12(2). For example, in a case where the private practice physician has a more significant relationship with the patient whose privacy was breached, notice from that physician (rather than from the custodian who disclosed the information) may be prudent. So long as the notice is given as required upon the events described in section 12(2) (and complies with the other requirements of that section), I agree with THP that circumstances such as the patient’s interests and the relationships between the patients and the various custodians involved may be relevant factors in deciding how best to fulfil the notification obligation. I am not persuaded that applying such an approach to notification in future cases would have the consequences of discouraging hospitals from adopting EMR technologies, or from participating in broader initiatives like a provincial electronic health record system.

Implications

The kind of shared accountability invited by this decision can cause confusion and risk. It will behoove hospitals and other custodians who provide shared access to their EMR systems to be very clear and detailed in establishing who is responsible for what. The hospital in this case, for example, decided post-incident to make more clear that physicians who are given outside access are responsible for training and supervising their employees. It also expressly obligated physicians to participate in privacy investigations arising from the actions of an employee.

The IPC’s finding on who provides notification is very qualified, and rests partly on the fact that the hospital in this case voluntarily provided notification to affected individuals. While taking control of notification may be beneficial to hospitals who maintain and provide third-party access to EMR systems, providing notification may also signal responsibility for a breach and for the related risks for which hospitals have little or no ability to control. The hospital in this case dealt with this tension by stipulating to its physicians that they may be named in hospital notification letters “as being responsible for the breach.” Other hospitals, may wish to require physicians to notify themselves in certain circumstances. The IPC’s decision does not appear to preclude such alternatives.

Trillium Health Partners (Re), 2020 CanLII 15333 (ON IPC).

Who’s the HIC?

Who is the “health information custodian” when an institution with an educational mandate provides health care? PHIPA gives institutions choice. Here’s a presentation I gave yesterday in which I argue that the institution (and not its employed practitioners) should assume the role of the HIC. Also includes some simple content on the new PHIPA breach notification amendment.

The Saskatchewan OIPC okays health authority’s incident response

On June 8th, the Office of the Saskatchewan Information and Privacy Commissioner issued an investigation report in which it held that a regional health authority responded appropriately to a privacy breach. Most notably, the OIPC reinforced a recommendation about notification included in its 2015 publication, Privacy Breach Guidelines. The recommendation:

Unless there is a compelling reason not to, [health information] trustees should always notify affected individuals.

This is a novel and conservative variation on the normal harms-related principle that guides notification. It is simply a recommendation – and one directed only at public agencies and health information trustees in Saskatchewan. It is notable nonetheless, however, in that it reflects an arguably developing public sector norm. Right or wrong, there is a unique pressure on public sector institutions to notify that should always be considered as part of a public sector institution’s careful response to a data handling incident.

Investigation Report 101-2016 (8 June 2016).

Cybersecurity and data loss (short presentation)

Here’s a 10 minute presentation I gave to the firm yesterday that puts some trends in context and addresses recent breach notification amendments.

CORRECTION. I made a point in this presentation that the Bill 119 amendments to PHIPA remove a requirement to notify of unauthorized “access” – a positive add given the statute does not include a harms-related threshold for notification. Section 1(2) of the Bill, I have now noticed, amends the definition of  “use” as follows: “The definition of ‘use’ in section 2 of the Act is amended by striking out ‘means to handle or deal with the information” and substituting ‘means to view, handle or otherwise deal with the information.’ The removal of “access” from the breach notification provision will therefore not invite a change.