Case Report – Court lacks jurisdiction to grant access to materials not filed

On December 31st, the Nova Scotia Supreme Court held that it did not have jurisdiction to order access to records that were referenced in a joint sentencing submission but not entered as exhibits.

The CBC applied for an order against the RCMP, who possessed audio and video recordings made in the course of a high profile murder investigation. The CBC relied on section 2(b) of the Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms and argued access was necessary to assess the joint sentencing submission. The Court held that, given the records had not been filed in Court, the proper forum for such a request was the Federal Court under the authority of the Access to Information Act.

Canadian Broadcasting Corporation v. Canada (Attorney General), 2009 NSSC 400.

Hot topics in workplace privacy

I’d like to thank the organizers of the Human Resources Professional Association 20X Annual Conference, at which I spoke today. My presentation was entitled, “Everything you need to know about workplace Privacy” – really a “hot topics” presentation, with content on internet background screening, e-mail and communication monitoring, cross-border processing of employee information and the privacy issues related to pandemic planning. The only hot topic I missed was the most recent – criminal background checks in light of the RCMP’s recent policy directive. For more on that, see the article I  published over at Slaw.ca today.

Best regards!

D.

<div style=”width:425px;text-align:left” id=”__ss_3002749″><a style=”font:14px Helvetica,Arial,Sans-serif;display:block;margin:12px 0 3px 0;text-decoration:underline;” href=”http://www.slideshare.net/dannym999/everything-you-needed-to-know-about-workplace-privacy&#8221; title=”Everything You Needed To Know About Workplace Privacy”>Everything You Needed To Know About Workplace Privacy</a><object style=”margin:0px” width=”425″ height=”355″><param name=”movie” value=”http://static.slidesharecdn.com/swf/ssplayer2.swf?doc=everythingyouneededtoknowaboutworkplaceprivacy-100127061646-phpapp01&rel=0&stripped_title=everything-you-needed-to-know-about-workplace-privacy&#8221; /><param name=”allowFullScreen” value=”true”/><param name=”allowScriptAccess” value=”always”/><embed src=”http://static.slidesharecdn.com/swf/ssplayer2.swf?doc=everythingyouneededtoknowaboutworkplaceprivacy-100127061646-phpapp01&rel=0&stripped_title=everything-you-needed-to-know-about-workplace-privacy&#8221; type=”application/x-shockwave-flash” allowscriptaccess=”always” allowfullscreen=”true” width=”425″ height=”355″></embed></object><div style=”font-size:11px;font-family:tahoma,arial;height:26px;padding-top:2px;”>View more <a style=”text-decoration:underline;” href=”http://www.slideshare.net/”>presentations</a&gt; from <a style=”text-decoration:underline;” href=”http://www.slideshare.net/dannym999″>dannym999</a&gt;.</div></div>

Case Report – Arbitrator orders stipulations on use of in-plant video surveillance

Last July, Arbitrator Craven partially upheld a policy grievance that challenged the expansion of an employer’s in-plant video surveillance system. Last December 14th, he issued a remedial order that imposed certain conditions on the employer’s use of video surveillance.

As I explained in this post, last July Arbitrator Craven found that the employer had breached a technological change provision in its collective agreement by not engaging in discussions with the union when it expanded its system. He ordered the employer to meet with the union to engage in discussions.

The parties were not able to reach a resolution, and came back before Arbitrator Craven in December. Following a hearing, he made an order that included the following stipulations:

  1. The Employer shall not use the video surveillance system to monitor employees, in real time or otherwise.
  2. Recordings made by the video surveillance system shall be retained for no longer than six (6) months, except in the circumstances set out in the following paragraph.
  3. When an incident or investigation occurs requiring the retention of video surveillance recordings, the Employer may retain those recordings for as long as is necessary for the purpose of dealing with the specific incident or investigation (including any related legal process or proceeding), but shall not use them for any other purpose.
  4. When the Employer intends to use recordings made by the video surveillance system in any legal process or proceeding which specifically relates to the Union or to a member of the bargaining unit, the Employer shall provide the Union with a copy of the recordings prior to their use in the legal process or proceeding.
  5. When the Employer intends to rely on recordings made by the video surveillance system in support of employee discipline, the Union and the employee concerned shall have the same right to access and view the recordings as if they were documents in the central personnel file as provided for in article 4.03(a) of the Collective Agreement.

Despite the reference in the fifth stipulation, none of these appear to turn on any specific collective agreement language.

Cargill Foods, division of Cargill Ltd. v. United Food and Commercial Workers International Union, Local 633 (Collective Agreement Grievance), [2009] O.L.A.A. No. 633 (Craven) (QL).

The ugly, the bad and the good of cloud computing

I’d like to thank the members of the Information, Management, Privacy and Access Committee of the Ontario Association of School Business Officials, who invited me to address the subject of privacy compliance and cloud computing at their winter workshop today.

Here’s a snippet from my prepared speech (so you can understand the theme). I’ve also put my slides below.

…and that’s the thing. The cloud is a metaphor for the internet, and it’s a very pejorative metaphor if you’re a privacy person. It implies that the party receiving services has a cloudy idea of the computing resources that are being applied to its data.

So it’s this loose control concept that has thus far defined cloud computing that causes privacy and security concerns – and rightly so. Since school boards have a need to control their data because of regulation and other reasons, they need to work with cloud vendors to re-shape the concept if they are to reap the benefits of the cloud.

The presentation included discussion on the Lakehead University Google outsourcing, the 2005 British Columbia “Maximus outsourcing” and the very useful report by the Alberta Commissioner on public sector outsourcing practices.

Case Report – Federal Commissioner dismisses GPS complaint

In a recently published decision that is dated May 27, 2009, the Office of the Privacy Commissioner of Canada dismissed a GPS complaint as not-well founded. The decision is evidence of a developing model for permissible GPS use in the Canadian privacy commission and arbitral jurisprudence.

Decision-makers have recognized that vehicle-based GPS systems entail the collection of non-sensitive personal information. Such systems are therefore ordinarily upheld for common fleet management purposes such as dispatch, scheduling and driver safety. Use of GPS data in support of investigations or exception follow-up also appears to be safe. In this case, for example, the OPC held that it was reasonable for a transit organization (the custodian of the GPS data) to report late arrivals to its contracted driver’s employer. Other requirements include notification and the implementation of reasonable security measures.

The limits? There is an expressed aversion to the use of GPS for routine supervisory purposes; in ordinary circumstances GPS is not a substitute for calling a driver to check on his or her whereabouts. Use of GPS as a tool to manage a documented performance management problem on a time-limited basis might be looked upon more favorably.

The case also raises an notable scenario about PIPEDA application, but I will save my thoughts on this complex subject for another day.

PIPEDA Case Summary #2009-011.

Information Roundup – 19 January 2010

Here are some recent links within the domain that you might appreciate:

I’d like to take this opportunity to offer a warm congratulations to “senior” blogger Michael Fitzgibbon. Michael, who blogs at “Thoughts from a Management Lawyer,” has taken his practice from its long-time home on Bay Street to continue it based on a more personal and innovative vision. All the best Michael! I just hope you still have time for Thoughts!

Dan

Case Report – Court says government must not use Norwich orders to investigate crime

On January 4th, Justice Donald Brown of the Ontario Superior Court of Justice made the following statement in dismissing a motion for a Norwich order (for pre-action production) that was brought by the Attorney-General for the purpose of tracing funds in anticipation of an application for forfeiture of money:

Norwich orders should not be used for purposes of criminal investigation. The Criminal Code and Provincial Offences Act both contain tools, available in specified circumstances, to assist in the investigation of crime. The equitable jurisdiction of the courts on which rests the power to issue Norwich orders should not be used to assist in criminal investigations. In my view courts must be vigilant in ensuring that requests for Norwich orders by the AGO, or any other government department or agency, are limited to the purpose of assisting in initiating civil proceedings, and not subtly converted into a device to investigate crime. Requests by government actors to compel disclosure of personal information from third parties, such as financial institutions, engage the consideration of privacy interests which are protected by section 8 of the Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms. To ensure the continued protection of such interests in the context of civil proceedings initiated by the government, the courts should screen and measure carefully requests by government parties for the issuance of the “rare and extraordinary” device of the Norwich order.

On the facts, Justice Brown dismissed the motion because the Attorney-General’s materials did not demonstrate a sufficient link between the information requested and the tracing of funds recoverable under the Civil Remedies Act.

Attorney General of Ontario v. Two Financial Institutions, 2010 ONS 47 (CanLII).

Case Report – Bare claim that individual published an anonymous letter can proceed

The British Columbia Court of Appeal recently published a November 19th defamation judgment in which it declined to strike a defamation claim because it did not allege facts to connect an anonymous letter to the defendant alleged to have published it.

The defendant (by counterclaim) argued that defamation pleadings are subject to a high standard of particularity and that the pleading of the plaintiff (by counterclaim) demonstrated mere speculation that she wrote the anonymous letter. She also argued that the plaintiff should not benefit from the presumption of truth normally accorded to pleadings attacked on the basis of their sufficiency given his speculation. The Court disagreed, stating:

With respect, this argument takes cases such as Swan v. Craig much farther than they should be taken. The counterclaim clearly alleges that Ms. Tyabji “authored” and “prepared” the anonymous letter and forwarded it to O’Connor, Canwest, Marissen and Janke; that the letter contained untrue statements that were defamatory of Blair Wilson; and that he suffered damage as a result. All the necessary elements of the cause of action were alleged. The fact that all the allegations have been denied does not change this fact; it simply means that the issues have been joined. It is not even necessary, in my view, to refer to the affidavit evidence that has been filed by Blair Wilson, to support this conclusion. Nor does the fact that the letter is anonymous on its face mean that something more is required in his pleadings. It cannot be said that Blair Wilson has beat around the bush in his counterclaim or made general allegations against a number of people without stating who did what, as occurred in Craig v. Langley Citizen’s Coalition 2003 BCSC 124 (CanLII), 2003 BCSC 124. The reader knows what the allegations against Ms. Tyabji are. If it turns out that in fact, she did not “author” or “prepare” the letter, then Blair Wilson will be mulcted in costs, but we will not know this until a trial has been held. The allegations may be “conclusory” in the sense that the Court will be asked to ‘connect’ some ‘dots’ but Blair Wilson has pleaded the facts material to each element of the cause of action in respect of Tyabji and Tugboat as he is required to do. A triable cause has clearly been made out.

The Court also rejected arguments that the plaintiff did not properly plead malice and breach of section 114 of the British Columbia Business Practices and Consumer Protection Act.

Lougheed v. Wilson, 2009 BCCA 537 (CanLII).

“Zubulake Revisited” a warning to Canadian litigants, but our law is different

On January 11th, Judge Schira Scheindlin of the United States District Court, Southern District of New York issued an opinion she entitled “Zubulake Revisited” – named after a series of landmark spoliation opinions she issued six years earlier. Since Zubulake, the Canadian law on spoliation has clearly diverged from that in the United States. While Judge Scheindlin’s recent dissection of corporate preservation processes contains excellent learning for Canadian organizations charged with meeting their preservation duties, it should not be the basis for assessing the merits of Canadian spoliation claims given our more forgiving remedial approach nor should it draw Canadian litigants to distraction from the merits of their litigation.

Judge Scheindlin’s most recent judgment is called The Pension Committee of the University of Montreal Pension Plan, et al. v. Banc of America Securities, LLC, et al. She orders an adverse inference instruction and costs against six plaintiffs who she finds grossly negligent in meeting their preservation duties and costs against seven other plaintiffs she finds guilty of mere negligence. In doing so, Judge Scheindlin describes how a court should use its inherent jurisdiction to control its process to deal with negligent preservation.

Judge Scheindlin says the purpose of a spoliation sanction is to (1) deter litigants from “engaging in spoliation,” (2) shift trial risks to the responsible party and (3) cure prejudice. She holds that a party who negligently destroys records in breach of a preservation duty may face a “severe sanction” such as dismissal, preclusion or imposition of an adverse inference if the other party proves prejudice. In cases of gross negligence, Judge Scheindlin argues for a rebuttable presumption of prejudice.

Compare this to the Canadian position as described by the Alberta Court of Appeal in its October 2008 Black & Decker decision:

In addition [to an inference of fact drawn from willful spoliation], the courts have a broad discretion to fashion remedies to avoid abuse of process, and the court’s rules of procedure are designed to assist the parties in ensuring trial fairness. Obviously, where the goal is to award remedies to even the playing field, the reason for destruction is less important. Generally such remedies are covered, and should be covered, through application of existing practice rules (or the development of further rules) and the exercise of the court’s discretion to avoid an abuse of process or award costs. Intention may not be necessary in those circumstances. But the unintentional destruction of evidence is not spoliation, and it is not appropriate to presume that missing evidence would tell against the person destroying it where the destruction is unintentional and the trier of fact cannot draw the adverse inference that the evidence was destroyed because it would tell against the spoliator.

Black & Decker is the current leading Canadian case on the remedies that flow from the breach of the duty to preserve. Unlike Judge Scheindlin, who says remedies should be granted (at least in part) to deter culpable conduct, the Alberta Court of Appeal suggests that the maintenance of trial fairness should be the primary guide to the exercise of discretion. Furthermore, it warns that that the striking of an action is an extraordinary remedy that must rest on willful misconduct: “While the court always has the inherent jurisdiction to strike an action to prevent an abuse of process, it should not do so where a plaintiff has lost or destroyed evidence, unless it is beyond doubt that this was a deliberate act done with the clear intention of gaining an advantage in litigation, and the prejudice is so obviously profound that it prevents the innocent party from mounting a defence.”

Ironically, Judge Scheindlin does express concern about litigation becoming “a ‘gotcha’ game rather than a full and fair opportunity to air the merits of the dispute.” Our own law has developed in a manner that more fully addresses this concern.

Big hat tip to Dominic Jaar of Ledjit for passing on this decision. For more on Canadian conservatism and the duty to preserve, see this Slaw article.

POSTSCRIPT. Following the publication of this post, Judge Scheindlin withdrew her originally-issued order and issued a revised order with clarifications that do not alter the point made in this post. The amending order is here and the consolidated amendment is here. Hat tip to Ralph Losey for covering the breaking news here.

Case Report – Divisional Court addresses meaning of “correctional record” in FIPPA

On December 8th, the Divisional Court affirmed the IPC/Ontario’s interpretation of “correctional record” as a record pertaining to sentenced inmates, not remanded inmates.

The Court held that the IPC was reasonable to assign “correctional” its ordinary meaning in the section 42(e) exemption for correctional records containing information supplied in confidence. It held this interpretation was within the range of possible, acceptable outcomes in light of (1) the express language giving “correctional” an expanded meaning in other Ontario statutes, (2) other language in FIPPA that addresses an alleged risk posed by the ordinary meaning construction and (3) the openness-favoring purpose of FIPPA.

This is confined in its significance to the interpretation of section 42(e) and is otherwise a standard of review and statutory interpretation case. The Court did make the following notable comment on how to construe exemptions in freedom of information legislation: “[The call for a purposive analysis] does not mean that a strict interpretation by itself with respect to exemptions in privacy statutes [sic] endows the interpretation with reasonableness.”

Ontario (Ministry of Community Safety and Correctional Services) v. Ontario (Information and Privacy Commissioner), [2009] O.J. No. 5455 (S.C.J.) (QL).