Judicial review not the regular means to challenge PIPEDA investigation reports

On January 15th the Federal Court dismissed two judicial review applications brought by a self represented applicant who took issue with two OPC investigation findings made under under PIPEDA. The Court held that an application under section 14 of PIPEDA, which invites a de novo hearing, was an adequate alternative remedy to judicial review:

In conclusion, I find that there is an adequate alternative remedy provided by section 14 of the PIPEDA that would have been the appropriate recourse to deal with all matters raised concerning the complaint, the OPC reports and the investigation that followed. When comparing the recourse provided by section 14 of the PIPEDA with the possibilities offered by judicial review, which is discretionary and extraordinary in nature and limited to the review of the reports and the documentation contained in the certified record, I find that the former is the appropriate recourse as the intent of the legislator to this effect is clear. I will not therefore exercise my discretion to judicially review the reports of the Privacy Commissioner, and I will dismiss both applications for judicial review.

In making this finding the Court suggested that a judicial review application to allege bias or that the OPC committed some other procedural injustice might be amenable to judicial review.

Kniss v Canada (Privacy Commissioner), 2013 FCC 31.

Judicial review petitition moot after requester loses interest in obtaining access to record

On January 8th, the Supreme Court of British Columbia dismissed a British Columbia Lottery Corporation petition for judicial review because the requester was no longer interested in receiving a copy of the policies and procedures manual at issue. It rejected the BCLC’s argument that the petition should be heard because of the prejudice it would face in dealing with future requests for the same record, stating “If, in the future, some other party seeks production of the Manual, the Commissioner will have to decide the matter based on the law and evidence as it then exists.”

British Columbia Lottery Corporation v Dyson, 2013 BCSC 11 (CanLII).

BC access decision quashed for improper consideration of expert evidence

On January 8th, the Supreme Court of British Columbia quashed an access decision because the Commissioner admitted opinion evidence, but did not consider it to be expert evidence.

The Court differed with the Commissioner in finding that the opinion was “necessary” to resolve an issue about whether the disclosure of sales data, by postal code, could reasonably be expected to cause economic harm to the British Columbia Lottery Corporation. The Commissioner held that the opinion was unnecessary because it went to the very question before her. The Court held that the opinion was necessary because it went to constituent facts such as whether the data had monetary value and could provide grey market competitors with a competitive advantage. Given the opinion met the criteria for admissibility, the Court held the Commissioner erred in law by failing to consider it as expert evidence. It said, “Opinion evidence is only admissible as expert evidence.”

British Columbia Lottery Corporation v Skelton, 2013 BCSC 12 (CanLII).

Case Report – Case about filing “unofficial transcript” of administrative tribunal hearing to proceed at BCCA

On August 10th, the British Columbia Court of Appeal granted leave to appeal a decision that permitted a judicial review applicant to file a self-produced transcript of a British Columbia Human Rights Tribunal hearing.

The applicant first asked the Tribunal to produce an official transcript and was denied. It then took recordings and produced its own transcript with the Tribunal’s consent pursuant to a provision in the Tribunal rules that specifies that such a recording, “is not part of the official record of the tribunal’s proceedings.”

The applicant lost on the merits and brought an application for judicial review. It alleged that the Tribunal breached procedural fairness by declining to record the hearing itself and also raised bias and “unreasonable findings of fact not supported by the evidence” as grounds for review. The applicant filed its “unofficial transcript” and the respondent was unsuccessful on its motion to strike.

In granting leave to appeal, the Court said:

Whether this development accords with the complex framework of modern administrative law in British Columbia seems to be a question that should be fully argued and canvassed. If leave were to be denied and the judicial review were to proceed, the issue could become lost in the ‘factual matrix’ of the case and the human rights and labour law communities would be left in doubt on this important evidentiary point. As it is, the hearing of the substantive issue before the court below has been adjourned a this appeal could be heard without delay.

SELI Canada Inc. v. Construction and Specialized Workers’ Union, Local 1611, 2010 BCCA 371 (CanLII).

Case Report – Div. Court issues significant decision on Ontario FOI exclusions

On March 26th the Divisional Court issued a significant decision on the Information Privacy Commissioner/Ontario’s jurisdiction to oversee claims that records are excluded from public access.

The requester asked the Ministry of the Attorney-General for access to records concerning the handling and progress of a high-profile prosecution. The MAG claimed the records requested were excluded by section 65(5.2) of FIPPA, which states, “This Act does not apply to records relating to a prosecution if all proceedings in respect of the prosecution have not been completed.”

The IPC routinely asks for the records subject to both exclusion and exemption claims, though this practice may be in some flux with respect records claimed to be subject to solicitor-client privilege since the Supreme Court of Canada’s Blood Tribe decision. In this case, when the MAG did not produce records voluntarily, the IPC ordered it to: (1) produce responsive records except those “clearly” subject to a solicitor-client privilege claim; (2) make exemption claims in the alternative to its exclusion claim; (3) prepare and produce an index of records; and (4) provide an affidavit in support of solicitor-client privilege claims.

Though the order was an interim order, the Court decided to hear the MAG application for judicial review. It held that the IPC erred in interpreting the scope of 65(5.2) and made an unreasonable order.

The section 65(5.2) decision is particularly significant given the Court’s finding that IPC erred in reading the words “relating to” as requiring a “substantial connection.” It said:

The meaning of the statutory words “relating to” is clear when the words are read in their grammatical and ordinary sense. There is no need to incorporate complex requirements for its application, which are inconsistent with the plain unambiguous meaning of the words of the statute.

The Adjudicator’s interpretation of the phrase “relating to” is also discordant with the intention of the Legislature. There are no pragmatic or policy reasons to impute a substantial connection requirement and depart from reading the words in their grammatical and ordinary sense in the context of the Act.

The IPC also applies the substantial connection test in adjudicating the employment records and teaching and research records exclusions. Though the language of these exclusions is slightly different than the language of section 65(5.2), the Court’s reasoning casts doubt on the use of the substantial connection test across-the-board.

The Court did not make a finding on whether IPC has the power to order the production of records that are claimed to be excluded nor did it opine on the scope of any such jurisdiction. It simply held that the IPC’s order was unreasonable because it would interfere with the interests the section 65(5.2) exclusion was intended to protect. Its disposition, however, suggests that looking at records claimed to be excluded is not necessary. Rather than send the matter back to the IPC, the Court simply declared that the request was for excluded records and could be brought back on when the underlying prosecution is complete. It did so on the face of the request.

Ministry of Attorney General and Toronto Star, 2010 ONSC 991 (CanLII).