Organization stumbles into BYOD nightmare

Hat tip to investigation firm Rubin Thomlinson for bringing an illustrative British Columbia arbitration decision to my attention. The remarkable April 2019 case involves an iPhone wiped by an employee’s wife mid-investigation!

The iPhone was owned by the employer, but it set it up using the employee’s personal Apple ID. That is not uncommon, but the employer apparently did not use any mobile device management software. To enforce its rights, the employer relied solely on its mobile device (administrative) policy, which disclaimed all employee privacy rights and stipulated that all data on employer devices is employer-owned.

Problems arose after the employer received a complaint that the employee was watching his female colleagues. The complainants said the employee “might also be taking pictures” with his phone.

The employer met with the employee to investigate, and took custody of the phone. The employee gave the employer the PIN to unlock the phone, but then asked for the phone back because it contained personal information. The employer excluded the employee and proceeded to examine the phone, but did not finish its examination before the employee’s wife (who the employee had phoned) remotely wiped the phone and refused to restore it with backup data.

The employer terminated the employee for watching the complainants (though not necessarily taking their pictures) and for insubordination.

The arbitrator held that the employer did not prove either voyeurism or insubordination. In doing so, he held that the employer had sufficient justification to search the phone but that it could not rely on its mobile device policy to justify excluding the employee from the examination process and demanding the recovery of the lost data. Somewhat charitably, the arbitrator held that the employee ought to be held “accountable for failing to make an adequate effort to encourage his wife to allow for recovery of the data” and reserved his decision on the appropriate penalty.

The employer took far too much comfort from its ownership of the device. Given the phone was enabled by the employee’s personal Apple ID, the employer was faced with all the awkwardness, compromise and risks of any BYOD arrangement. Those risks can be partially mitigated by the use of mobile device management software. Policy should also clearly authorize device searches that are to be conducted with a view to the (quite obvious) privacy interest at stake.

District of Houston v Canadian Union of Public Employees, Local 2086, 2019 CanLII 104260 (BC LA).

For Rubin Thomlinson’s more detailed summary of the case, please see here.

 

 

BC OIPC addresses network security and endpoint monitoring

Today, the Office of the Information and Privacy Commissioner for British Columbia held that the District of Saanich breached the British Columbia Freedom of Information and Protection of Privacy Act by installing endpoint monitoring software on employee workstations.

The District’s plan was not well conceived – apparently arising out of a plan to shore up IT security because the District’s new mayor was “experienced in the area of IT.”

The District installed a product called Spector 360 – a product billed as a “comprehensive user activity monitoring solution.” This is software that enables the collection of detailed data from “endpoints” on a network. It is not intrusion detection software or software that helps analyze events across a network (which the OPIC noted is in use at other British Columbia municipalities).

The District enabled the software on 13 workstations of “high profile users” to capture a full range of endpoint data, including screenshots captured at 30 second intervals and data about all keystrokes made. The purported purpose of this implementation was to support incident response, a purpose the OIPC suggested could only support an inadequate, reactive IT security strategy.

The OIPC held that the District collected personal information without the authorization it required under FIPPA and failed to notify employees as required by FIPPA. I’ll save on the details because the OIPC’s application of FIPPA is fairly routine. I will note that the OIPC’s position is balanced and seems to adequately respect institutions’ need to access system information for IT security purposes. It acknowledges, for example, that some limited data collection from endpoints is justifiable to support incident response. Not surprisingly, the OIPC does not endorse taking screen shots or collecting keystroke data.

Investigation Report F15-01, 2015 BCIPC No. 15.