Case Report – Investigative records that find their way into prosecutor’s brief not exempt as “prepared” for counsel

On March 6th, the Ontario Divisional Court held that the police investigation records are not exempt from public access as being “prepared” for Crown counsel merely because they are incorporated into a Crown brief.

The dispute involved the so-called “Branch 2” privilege created by section 19(b) of the Ontario Freedom of Information and Protection of Privacy Act. It exempts records from public access that were “prepared by or for Crown counsel for use in giving legal advice or in contemplation of or for use in litigation.”

The Court held that preparing a record for the (policing) purpose of investigating a matter and deciding to lay charges is distinct from preparing a record for the purpose of prosecution. It also held that the detailed exemptions in the Act for “law enforcement records” were an indication that the legislature did not intend the Branch 2 privilege exemption to protect the Crown brief. The law enforcement exemption includes a subpart meant to preserve trial fairness, but this could not be relied upon in the circumstances because the Crown had withdrawn the charges at issue.

Ontario (Attorney General) v. Information and Privacy Commissioner, 2009 CanLII 9740 (CanLII).

Case Report – Appeal court says “no knock” entries need not be endorsed in a warrant

On February 26th, the New Brunswick Court of Appeal held that the police need not have express authorization to use a “no knock” or “dynamic” entry in searching a suspect’s residence. The thrust of the judgement is nicely summarized in the following paragraph:

Neither the police nor the Crown requested the issuing judge make an endorsement authorizing a “no knock” entry. Furthermore, the issuing judge did not, on his own motion, choose to make such an endorsement. I also note there is no legislative provision which requires or permits such an endorsement. No doubt for good reason. It does not take much imagination to think of situations where circumstances change after the issuance of a warrant, which either eliminate the need for a “no knock” entry or require one which was previously thought unnecessary. Following the issuance of the warrant, police officers and judges should not be required to meet again to address the appropriate mode of entry. To impose such a requirement upon police and the judiciary would result in the micro-management of police investigations. The development of the law should not sanction the management of police operations by the judiciary except where necessary in the course of fulfilling judicial functions. I do not consider the pre-determination of the method by which police are to exercise their discretion and respond to changing circumstances in executing the search of a suspect’s premises to constitute part of the judicial function.

Based on this reasoning, the Court also held that the evidence the Crown can use in demonstrating that the reasonableness of using a no knock entry is not limited to that which it put before the issuing judge.

R. v. Perry and Richard, 2009 NBCA 12 (CanLII).

Case Report – BCCA deals with production of class member records in proportionality decision

In a February 13th oral judgement, the British Columbia Court of Appeal affirmed an order that required the province to produce records pertaining to class members who had not opted out of a class proceeding.

The proceeding alleges systemic negligence and breach of fiduciary in the operation of a residential school. In ordering production of records related to individuals who had not opted out of a potential class of up to 2,200 members, the Court affirmed three findings:

that production should not be denied because of the records’ potential misuse as evidence of individual incidents (given their prima facie relevance to the systemic breach claims);
that production should not be denied based on privacy concerns given that potential class members were given notice and an opportunity to protect their files from disclosure by opting out; and
that production should not be denied based on the scope of production (about 2.2 million pages of records), noting that the production request was not “a futile search for documents of unknown relevance.”

As the concept of “proportional” production takes greater prominence in Canadian civil procedure, this case is a nice illustration of how the cost of production can have various elements. One might argue that it demonstrates a rather traditional or fulsome-production view, where costs related to procedural complications and delay, privacy and document review do not weigh heavily in the balance.

Richard v. British Columbia, 2009 BCCA 77.

Case Report – Alberta court upholds privacy complaint for disclosure of faculty member merit award

On February 29th, the Alberta Court of Queen’s Bench affirmed an Alberta OPIC finding that a university had breached the Alberta Freedom of Information and Protection of Privacy Act by disclosing a faculty member’s recommended merit increase.

The complaint involved a document circulated within the complainant’s department that included information about the department chair’s annual merit increase recommendations. The document did not include names, but associated merit increase recommendations with data on papers published. The complainant argued that his merit increase was disclosed given that it was associated with data about an unnamed person who had published 37 papers in the year. The university argued that it had only disclosed statistical information.

The Court’s finding is very fact-specific, but does illustrate that whether information is “personal information” – information about an identifiable individual – can depend on the context in which it is published. The Court held that the OIPC reasonably concluded that the data on papers published revealed the complainant’s identity given the size of the department and the complainant’s well known and relatively superior level of academic output.

There are other aspects of the Court judgement that are noteworthy, including the more principled (but not surprising) finding that the document was not excluded from the act as “research information” or “teaching material.”

University of Alberta v. Alberta (Information and Privacy Commissioner), 2009 ABQB 112 (CanLII).

Case Report – “Crown brief” production issue heading to BCCA

On February 3rd, the British Columbia Court of Appeal granted leave and expedited the appeal of an order that required the Vancouver Police Department to produce records that had become part of the Crown’s brief in a ongoing prosecution.

The plaintiff is the father of a man who was struck and killed by a motor vehicle in a hit and run. The defendant is the man charged criminally for the hit and run. The defendant’s criminal trial has been adjourned and will re-commence later this year. In the meantime, the defendant did not produce to the plaintiff the materials he received from the Crown in its disclosure. This led the plaintiff to apply for third-party production from the police. The Crown then objected, claiming litigation privilege and public interest immunity.

The Supreme Court ordered production last December. It ultimately applied a screening test like that endorsed by the Ontario Court of Appeal in D.P. v. Wagg and held that the Crown had not demonstrated that the balance of public and private interests weighed against production:

The Crown has tendered affidavit evidence suggesting that the criminal prosecution might be jeopardized by disclosure of any documents to the plaintiff because the material might find its way to potential witnesses, to the jury pool, or to persons who could seek to subvert the course of justice. While the affidavit evidence contains general statements of possible adverse effects resulting from premature disclosure, it does not identify any specific concerns in the context of the Antunes prosecution. Moreover, the possibility of any adverse effect can be materially reduced, or eliminated, by an appropriate undertaking from counsel and the plaintiff in the civil action.

Though this is a fairly discrete finding, in granting leave the Court of Appeal framed the issue broadly and as being about “the treatment of police investigations results in civil proceedings while criminal charges are outstanding” – that is, as being about the very principles reflected in Wagg. It indicated that hearing dates were available in late March and April and ordered the appellant’s factum to be delivered in late February.

Wong v. Antunes, 2009 BCCA 60.

Case Report – Government fails to meet burden of proving solicitor-client privilege

On February 10th, Madam Justice Layden-Stevenson of the Federal Court held that the Minister of Fisheries and Oceans failed to prove a claim that two sentences in a ministerial briefing document were subject to solicitor-client privilege. The Minister argued the sentences, which were not authored by a lawyer, were revealing of legal advice. In dismissing this claim, Layden-Stevenson commented:

Regarding the Minister’s submission that disclosure of the name of the lawyer is tantamount to disclosure of that which is subject to solicitor-client privilege, I would think that if that were so, it ought to have been stated in Mr. Ahluwalia’s affidavit.

She also held that the Minister had waived privilege by implication given disclosure of similar information in the record before the Court.

Environmental Defence Canada v. Canada (Fisheries and Oceans), 2009 FC 131 (CanLII).

Case Report – Another subscriber data search challenge dismissed

On February 18th, the Ontario Superior Court of Justice held that the police conducted a lawful search by asking an ISP for a subscriber’s name and residential address in order to link that information with a known IP address. Unlike in its February 10th decision in Wilson, the Court accepted that the disclosure of a subscriber’s name and residential address is revealing of the “details of the lifestyle and personal choices of [an] individual” because it allows for the identification of an anonymous internet user. The Court nonetheless held the applicant lacked a reasonable expectation of privacy in the information given the terms of the contract his mother (and co-resident) had entered into with the ISP.

R. v. Vasic, 2009 CanLII 6842 (ON S.C.).

Case Report – BCCA upholds ban on identifying third-party suspect

On February 26th, the British Columbia Court of Appeal upheld a ban on identifying a man linked to a series of sexual assaults that will be raised in Ivan Henry’s appeal from conviction.

Ivan Henry was convicted on several sexual assault charges in 1983 and served 26 years in prison. In mid-January the British Columbia Court of Appeal granted his application to reinstate a previously dismissed appeal. As part of the reinstated appeal, Mr. Henry will raise a series of sexual assaults that occurred after his arrest that involved a similar modus operandi to that used by the perpetrator of the assaults for which he was convicted. “Mr. X” was charged and convicted for perpetrating three of these assaults in 2005 and is now on parole. He has not been charged in respect of any of the other assaults.

The Court of Appeal applied the Dagenais/Mentuck test and upheld the publication ban, finding a continuation of the ban is necessary to protect Mr. X’s privacy interest and will have a minimal impact on free expression and open justice. Its reasoning is summarized in the following paragraph:

In this case, Mr. X is on parole and living in a half-way facility. He has not been charged, and unless and until he is convicted, he is presumed to be innocent of the unsolved offences which were the subject of the Smallman investigation. The publication of his name is not necessary in any way to Mr. Henry’s appeal. The public interest in the openness of trials and the administration of justice is not, in my view, diminished by the withholding of his name. All proceedings have been, and will continue to be, carried out in the open. On the other hand, the reporting of Mr. X’s personal circumstances, combined with inflammatory demands by the media that his parole be revoked and statements that he is a “prime suspect” and a “dangerous sexual predator” being allowed to “live anonymously among us”, mean that Mr. X’s privacy and even security interests will be at risk if his name is published — more so than in the usual case of persons suspected but uncharged. If our society takes seriously the proposition that a person in Mr. X’s position is presumed innocent until proven guilty, it seems to me that the deleterious effects, both on his privacy interests and on the administration of justice, of the publication of his name do outweigh the public interest in knowing that fact.

R. v. Henry, 2009 BCCA 86.